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Minimizing Game Score Violations in
College Football Rankings
B. Jay Coleman
Department of Management, Marketing, and Logistics, Coggin College of Business, University of North Florida,
4567 St. Johns Bluff Road, South, Jacksonville, Florida 32224-2645, jcoleman@unf.edu
One metric used to evaluate the myriad ranking systems in college football is retrodictive accuracy. Maximizing
retrodictive accuracy is equivalent to minimizing game score violations: the number of times a past game’s
winner is ranked behind its loser. None of the roughly 100 current ranking systems achieves this objective.
Using a model for minimizing violations that exploits problem characteristics found in college football, I found
that all previous ranking systems generated violations that were at least 38 percent higher than the minimum.
A minimum-violations criterion commonly would have affected the consensus top five and changed participants
in the designated national championship game in 2000 and 2001—but not in the way most would have expected.
A final regular season ranking using the model was perhaps the best prebowl ranking published online in 2004,
as it maximized retrodictive accuracy and was nearly the best at predicting the 28 bowl winners.
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The National Collegiate Athletic Association(NCAA) conducts officially sponsored national
football championship tournaments in all four of its
divisions, except for Division 1-A (its highest divi-
sion). It has determined the Division 1-A football
champion via a poll or a mathematical-ranking sys-
tem since 1926. The top-rated team(s) according to the
two so-called major polls, the Associated Press (AP)
nationwide poll of sportswriters and broadcasters,
which began in 1936, and the USA Today (formerly
USA Today/ESPN) poll of coaches, which began in
its current form in 1991, is (are) generally regarded
by the public as the national champion(s) each year
(NCAA Online 2004). Moreover, since 1998, the Bowl
Championship Series (or BCS, operated by the six
most powerful Division 1-A conferences and Notre
Dame) has employed opinion polls, such as these,
along with a variety of mathematical-ranking sys-
tems as part of a formula to determine which two
teams to select to participate in its officially recog-
nized national championship game. The winner of
this game is deemed to be the national champion
according to the USA Today poll (BCS Media Guide
2003). The BCS also uses its ranking to determine eli-
gibility for invitation to the BCS’s other three games
(BCSfootball.org 2005a), with payouts of $14 to 17 mil-
lion to each team (BCSfootball.org 2005b), compared
to a payout of $7.4 million for the best non-BCS bowl
(Staples 2005). The ramifications of these rankings
(monetarily and otherwise) are therefore quite sub-
stantial.
However, the NCAA recognizes 12 different polls
(or entities naming national champions) and 21 dif-
ferent mathematical-ranking schemes on its Web site,
some of which have determined champions retroac-
tively as far back as 1869 (NCAA Online 2004). Of
these 33 systems, 21 were in use for 2003. Although
the AP and the USA Today opinion polls tend to
get the greatest publicity, 14 of the 21 systems the
NCAA listed for 2003 were mathematical. In addi-
tion, many authors have developed their own mathe-
matical approaches to ranking college football teams.
Kenneth Massey, whose mathematical-ranking system
is part of the BCS formula, maintains a Web site,
which at the end of the 2003 season posted the results
of 97 different ranking approaches (Massey 2004b).
Massey also compiles and posts a consensus rank-
ing derived from all 97 sources and provides links
to any associated Web sites provided by the ranking
authors.
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For many of the most widely recognized mathemat-
ical systems (for example, six of the seven systems
used in the BCS formula in 2003 (Callaghan et al.
2004)), neither the NCAA nor the authors of these
systems provide detailed descriptions of the models,
and apparently no descriptions have been published.
This lack of description makes it difficult to assess the
merits of each method, and it likely contributes to the
public’s disregard for the results and preference for
the less objective opinion polls. Another likely con-
tributor to the math systems’ unpopularity is a some-
what deserved public skepticism regarding black-box
computerized math models (Keener 1993).
Perhaps the leading cause of the media’s and the
public’s disdain for mathematical-ranking systems is
the common face-validity problem that surfaces when
a team is ranked below an opponent that it defeated
during the season, particularly when the teams are
very close to each other in the rankings (that is,
team A defeated team B, yet team B is ranked imme-
diately or a few spots ahead of team A). It’s even
more disturbing when the two teams are in the top
five or top 10 and greatly so when such a rank-
ing influences which two teams play in the BCS
national championship game. For example, at the end
of the 2000 regular season, the BCS designated Florida
State University (FSU) to play for the national cham-
pionship (as the second-ranked team in the coun-
try, according to the BCS formula), even though
Miami (FL) had defeated FSU during the course of
the season and was immediately behind FSU in the
ranking. The mathematical-ranking systems included
in the BCS formula were the cause of the contro-
versy, because the AP and USA Today/ESPN opinion
polls used in the formula both ranked Miami second,
immediately ahead of FSU. In a similar outcome in
2001, Nebraska was second in the final BCS ranking
and thus was selected to play in the national cham-
pionship game, even though third-ranked Colorado
had defeated Nebraska by a large margin in the last
game of the regular season. As in 2000, the third-
ranked team in 2001 (Colorado) was ranked ahead
of Nebraska by the two major opinion polls. In both
cases, the influence of the math systems in the for-
mula caused the reversal, and people’s perception of
the math models took a major public relations hit.
In the jargon of tournament theory, these rever-
sals of game results are called violations in the rank-
ing (Ali et al. 1986). There are two primary reasons
why such reversals are common among the math
models (and why they are common among opinion
polls). First, to some extent, they are unavoidable. The
nature of game results is such that many cyclic triads
are always present, in which team A beats team B,
team B defeats team C, and team C beats team A.
In the presence of a cyclic triad, there is no way to
rank the three teams involved to avoid a game score
reversal. Second, designing a mathematical procedure
to minimize the number of violations in a ranking
has proven extremely difficult and computationally
time-consuming for large-scale problems (Grotschel
et al. 1984, Laguna et al. 1999). This difficulty par-
tially explains why none of the math systems the BCS
currently uses and none of the 97 methods Kenneth
Massey listed in 2003 on his Web site have been
designed specifically to minimize violations.
However, given that the number of violations in the
ranking is a retrodictive indicator of ranking quality
(as Massey 2004a states, it’s “an indication of how
well a system explains past results”), Massey regu-
larly reports a ranking violation percentage for each
of the systems compiled on his site. This metric repre-
sents the percentage of all games played by the teams
ranked in which the losing team is ranked ahead of
the game’s winner, without accounting for any adjust-
ments for home-field advantage and without weight-
ing any games more heavily than others. For example,
for the 2003 season, the average violation percent-
age was 18.5 percent, with a range of 12.4 percent to
22.6 percent, for the 93 (out of 97) systems that ranked
all 117 Division 1-A teams. The four omitted included
the two major opinion polls that rank only a smaller
number, such as a top 25 (Massey 2004b). In 2003,
the total number of games played by the 117 teams
in Division 1-A against each other was 699, meaning
that these 93 systems produced an average of approx-
imately 129 game score reversals, with a range from
87 to 158.
Do any of the current systems come close to cre-
ating a ranking that minimizes the number of game
score reversals? Given the disfavor and controversy
that surround systems that clearly do not directly
address the issue, it seems a worthy question to
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pursue. Yet no previous analyst has successfully done
so. I developed a fairly simple mixed binary integer-
programming model efficient enough to determine
the minimum number of violations possible (and thus
the maximum retrodictive accuracy) for a full season
of Division 1-A college football. The model gains its
efficiencies by exploiting aspects of the ranking prob-
lem in college football that other models have typi-
cally not addressed for minimum-violations rankings.
I applied the model to the 10 complete college football
seasons of 1994 through 2003 to determine the mini-
mum violations for those seasons and compared the
results to the ranking systems Massey compiled for
2000 through 2003. I then used the model as part of an
iterative procedure to determine whether the consen-
sus top five teams in any of these 10 seasons would
have been changed if one had enforced a minimum-
violations criterion. I also examined whether the par-
ticipants in any of the BCS national championship
games from 1998 through 2003 would have been
altered by a minimum-violations restriction.
Background
The minimum-violations problem is a version of
the more general linear-ordering problem, for which
Grotschel et al. (1984) and Schrage (1991) developed
mathematical-programming methods, and which has
wide-ranging applications outside the realm of sports,
including the triangulation of input-output matrices
in economics (Grotschel et al. 1984, Laguna et al.
1999). However, the college football application does
not adhere strictly to the criteria for a pure linear-
ordering problem. One major difference is that I allow
teams to be tied in the final rankings, a less restric-
tive stance that yields a more efficient mathematical
model than those developed for strict linear ordering.
In other words, if teams A and B did not play each
other during the season, it doesn’t matter whether A
is ranked ahead of B, B is ranked ahead of A, or A
and B are tied in the ranking—none of the three sce-
narios will create a violation.
Another difference is that most previously offered
models focused on developing the minimum-viola-
tions ranking for a so-called complete tournament (Ali
et al. 1986, Cook and Kress 1990). From the per-
spective of sports, a complete (or round-robin) tour-
nament is one in which all players (or teams) to
be ranked have played each other at least once.
This is clearly not the case for Division 1-A college
football, where the 117 teams currently play only
11 to 14 games, and this set of games may even
include the occasional second game against the same
team. The result is thus described as an incomplete
tournament—and in this case, a very incomplete one.
Methods previously developed for linear ordering
or determining a minimum-violations ranking have
had these and other assumptions that complicate their
use for ranking college football teams. Ali et al.’s
(1986) mathematical-programming model and enu-
meration method have the restrictions of no ties in
the rankings or the games and an assumption of a
complete tournament. The former is currently true in
college football but has not always been so (the 1996
institution of overtime abolished ties). To the extent
that my model has applications in other environments
in which ties are possible (for example, the National
Football League), allowing for tied games would be
advantageous. The developers of previous heuristic
methods have made similar assumptions. For exam-
ple, Cook and Kress (1990) allowed for tied games
but also assumed a complete tournament. Goddard
(1883, 1985) and Stob (1985) largely enforced simi-
lar restrictions. Although I could use Kendall’s (1962)
method of minimizing violations by ranking based
on the number of wins or the iterated Kendall (IK)
method of Ali et al. (1986) that breaks ties by exam-
ining opponent wins, the accuracy would be suspect
given the incomplete-tournament format in college
football. None of these heuristics could ensure opti-
mality for the current problem.
Beyond these assumption problems, previous opti-
mization models also suffer from serious efficiency
issues when addressing college football. The largest
complete-tournament, linear-ordering problems that
authors reported solving with optimization mod-
els contain only 60 teams (or items) to be ranked
(Grotschel et al. 1984), roughly half the number
of Division 1-A teams in 2003. The reason for the
intractability of large-scale problems is the potential
exponential proliferation of constraints and binary
integer variables associated with the growth in prob-
lem size (Ali et al. 1986, Grotschel et al. 1984, Schrage
1991). Although Grotschel et al. (1984) developed
algorithms for solving large cases efficiently (and
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using today’s technology, they would be capable of
solving much larger problems than the 60-item cases
reported in 1984), these algorithms require program-
ming effort far beyond that required by my model,
which can be solved by standard commercially avail-
able linear-programming software. Even fairly effi-
cient enumeration techniques, such as that Ali et al.
(1986) developed, can be far too time-consuming for
a problem the size of a full college football season.
In contrast, the presence of an incomplete tourna-
ment, and the allowance for ties in the ranking, yield
definite modeling efficiencies when determining the
minimum number of violations. We need binary vari-
ables for a pair of teams only if those teams played
each other during the season, meaning that we require
only 695 binary variables for the 2003 season (for a
team that defeated the same opponent twice, we need
only one binary variable; which explains why the 699
games in 2003 can be modeled with 695 binary vari-
ables). Moreover, my modeling approach differs from
that used by Ali et al. (1986), Grotschel et al. (1984),
and Schrage (1991), in requiring only a constraint
for each pair of teams that actually played, instead
of constraints involving pairs of teams regardless of
whether they played. My model for the 2003 season
therefore has only 695 constraints.
Methodology
I used my mixed binary integer program (Appendix),
model MinV, to determine the minimum violations
for college football. The model defines a continuous
variable representing the value (not the rank) for each
team; this continuous variable can be thought of as
the team’s power index. Using a constraint for each
game played, MinV sets a binary variable (represent-
ing a violation) equal to one if the value (power index)
of the winning team is not greater than the value
(power index) of the losing team by some arbitrary
minimal amount. Otherwise, it sets the binary (vio-
lation) variable for that game to zero. For each tied
game, MinV uses two additional continuous variables
and two binary variables (instead of one): one of these
variables will equal one if team A’s power index is
greater than team B’s, and the other will equal one if
the reverse is true. If the power indexes of the two
teams are equal, both binary variables will equal zero.
The objective function represents the sum of all the
binary variables (the sum of all the violations), count-
ing any violation in a tied game as half a violation.
Once MinV is solved, I simply rank order the teams
according to their power indexes reported in the solu-
tion. If desired, ties in the ranking between teams that
did not play each other can be broken arbitrarily (or
using a secondary objective) with no change in the
number of violations.
The model considers multiple game situations in
which the same two opponents each won once to be
separate events, with separate binary variables and
separate constraints. This implies that if the same two
teams played each other twice, with each team win-
ning one game, MinV will essentially force one team
to be ranked ahead of the other (the model solu-
tion will determine which), and one violation will
be counted in the objective function. In such a case,
one could argue that it might be more appropriate
to allow the two teams to tie in the final ranking,
and if the solution does so, no violations should be
assessed. However, I allowed a direct comparison to
the reported ranking-violation percentages of the var-
ious systems summarized by Massey (2004b, c), which
do not exhibit any ties in the ranking. (For the sea-
sons Massey covered, the NCAA allowed no game
ties because of the overtime rule. Thus, MinV’s com-
ponents that encourage ties in the ranking between
teams that actually tied a game did not influence com-
parative results.)
I applied my model to the college football seasons
from 1994 through 2003. I collected files for complete-
season game scores for 1994 through 2002 from James
Howell (2004), who is widely regarded as a reliable
source for scores files, for example, by Peter Wolfe
(2003), whose ranking system the BCS includes in
its formula. I collected the file for 2003 game scores
from Massey’s (2004e) Web site. I also collected from
Howell (2004) lists of the Division 1-A teams that
participated in each of the 10 seasons. I parsed the
scores files to eliminate data on games played by non-
Division 1-A teams and on games played by Divi-
sion 1-A schools against non-Division 1-A schools, so
that the model analyzed only data on games played
by two Division 1-A schools. I wrote code to read each
season’s game scores and write model MinV. I used
LINGO Version 8.0 (LINDO Systems 2003), running
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on a Pentium 4 (2.53 GHz) machine with 1 GB of
RAM to determine optimal solutions to MinV for the
10 seasons.
Results
MinV for each season generally determined the min-
imum number of violations within a few minutes
(Table 1). For five of the 10 seasons, the original run
of the model took less than 1.5 minutes. After some
minor adjustments to one component of the model
(Appendix), the running time in another two seasons
(2001 and 2002) was under 40 seconds. The only real
computational difficulty experienced was for 2000.
Within five minutes of running time, the model identi-
fied a high-quality solution that was within one viola-
tion of the lower bound, but LINGO did not establish
this as the optimal solution even after an extremely
lengthy run. However, subsequent runs of an adjusted
form of the model quickly established this value as
the optimal solution (Appendix).
The minimum number of violations MinV estab-
lished was much lower than that obtained by even
the best-performing existing college-football ranking
system (Table 2). For the 2003 season, the best retro-
dictive system Massey reported generated a violation
percentage of 12.4 percent of the 699 games played,
which translates into 87 game score violations. By
comparison, MinV established a minimum number of
violations of 63 (or nine percent of the games played).
Thus, the best system in 2003 generated a number
Division 1-A Division 1-A Total variables Total Pivots (minutes:seconds)
Year teams games (binary) constraints Required by LINGO
1994 107 593 739 (606) 619 67,514 (0:25)
1995 108 597 731 (605) 614 68,432 (0:17)
1996 111 614 725 (614) 614 3,942,014 (7:23)
1997 112 628 740 (628) 628 94,737 (0:23)
1998 112 627 739 (627) 627 17,260 (0:06)
1999 114 633 745 (631) 631 356,585 (1:25)
2000 115 641 754 (639) 639 250,701,233+ (613:08)
2001 117 652 769 (652) 652 39,860 (0:10)
2002 117 707 823 (706) 706 76,847 (0:38)
2003 117 699 812 (695) 695 1,272,280 (5:10)
Table 1: MinV generally determined the minimum number of violations in a few minutes for each NCAA Divi-
sion 1-A college football season from 1994–2003 (Appendix). For 2000, I terminated the branch-and-bound
process at the point noted, with the number of violations within one of the lower bound. Subsequent analysis
confirmed the solution’s optimality (Appendix).
of violations that was over 38 percent higher than
the minimum identified by MinV. The overall aver-
age violation percentage of 18.5 percent (or about
129 violations) for the 93 systems reported for 2003
represented a 105 percent increase over the MinV
result. I obtained similar results for 2000, 2001, and
2002, where MinV improved the best existing retro-
dictive systems by 45 violations (a total 82 percent
higher than MinV’s minimum), 33 violations (a total
61 percent higher than MinV’s minimum), and 34 vio-
lations (a total 62 percent higher than MinV’s min-
imum), respectively. When compared to the average
and worst-case performances of all published rank-
ings, the improvements are far more extensive. Since
2000, one online source (Beck 2004b) has given an
award of sorts for the best retrodictive ranking sys-
tem; MinV would have won in a landslide for all past
seasons.
Impact on the National Champion and
the Top Five
One criticism levied against the use of a minimum-
violations-ranking criterion is that such models do
not necessarily produce a unique ranking (Stob
1985). Multiple optima often exist, particularly for
minimum-violations rankings for very incomplete
tournaments. Thus, although model MinV identifies
one ranking that minimizes the number of game score
violations, there are likely others that would be more
attractive if one pursues a secondary objective while
holding the minimum number of violations constant.
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Division 1-A Minimum number Ranking system Ranking system Ranking system
Year games of violations average (%) minimum (%) maximum
1994 593 45.5 (7.7%) — — —
1995 597 45.5 (7.6%) — — —
1996 614 46 (7.5%) — — —
1997 628 43 (6.8%) — — —
1998 627 44 (7.0%) — — —
1999 633 63 (10.0%) — — —
2000 641 55 (8.6%) 18.3 15.6 231%
2001 652 54 (8.3%) 17.3 13.3 210%
2002 707 55 (7.8%) 17.5 12.6 212
2003 699 63 (9.0%) 18.5 12.4 226%
Table 2: The minimum number of game score violations MinV identified for the NCAA Division 1-A college football
seasons from 1994–2003 was far superior to the numbers that 58, 68, 75, and 93 different ranking systems
(Massey 2004b, c) produced in the years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively. Massey did not report ranking
violation statistics prior to 2000.
However, using an extension of model MinV to pur-
sue a secondary objective (for example, matching
game score differentials as closely as possible) while
holding the minimum violations constant, is much
more mathematically inefficient and is likely a worthy
avenue for future research.
However, it is fairly easy to extend the model to
determine whether the top five teams and particu-
larly the consensus national champion in each year
would have changed if one had used a minimum-
violations criterion. For the eight seasons of 1996
through 2003, Massey derived a consensus final rank-
ing and a consensus national champion by averaging
together all of the rankings from all the sources com-
piled for that year (Massey 2004b, c). I made matching
Year Number 1 Number 2 Number 3 Number 4 Number 5
1994 Nebraska (1) Penn State (2) Colorado (3) Alabama (5) Texas A&M (8)
1995 Nebraska (1) Florida (2) Tennessee (3) Florida St. (4) Colorado (5)
1996 Florida (1) Ohio St. (2) Florida St. (3) Arizona St. (5) Nebraska (4)
1997 Nebraska (1) Michigan (3) Florida (4) Florida St. (2) Tennessee (5)
1998 Tennessee (1) Ohio St. (2) Florida St. (3) Wisconsin (4) Florida (5)
1999 Florida St. (1) Nebraska (2) Va. Tech (3) Michigan (4) Kansas St. (5)
2000 Oklahoma (1) Nebraska (8) Washington (6) Miami (FL) (2) Florida St. (3)
2001 Miami (FL) (1) Tennessee (3) Florida (2) Oregon (4) LSU (9)
2002 Ohio St. (1) Miami (FL) (3) Georgia (4) Oklahoma (5) Texas (6)
2003 LSU (1) Southern Cal (2) Oklahoma (3) Georgia (4) Miami, OH (6)
Table 3: Although the national champions would not have been affected, the remainder of the consensus top
five NCAA Division 1-A college football teams for the 1994–2003 seasons often would have been adjusted
had a minimum-violations restriction been enforced (consensus rankings are in parentheses). I used Massey’s
(2004b, c) consensus rankings for 1996–2003 and the final Associated Press poll in 1994 and 1995. Massey did
not report a consensus ranking for 1994 or 1995.
his consensus top five for those seasons a secondary
objective. For 1994 and 1995, I used the top five teams
according to the AP media poll as a surrogate sec-
ondary target. Using model MinV as part of an iter-
ative process (Appendix), I identified a top five that
(1) did not force the minimum number of violations to
be surpassed, and (2) most closely matched the con-
sensus (or, in 1994 and 1995, the AP) top five (Table 3).
The consensus national champion would not have
changed in any of these seasons had a minimum-
violations criterion been enforced. In all 10 years, the
top team could have been assigned that position with-
out increasing the minimum number of violations.
I offer no comment on whether the consensus (or AP)
national champions were the appropriate teams to
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recognize, only that they could have been named
without surpassing the minimum violations.
Although the national champion would not have
changed in any year, a minimum-violations criterion
would have affected the remainder of the top five
in many years. In only three seasons (1995, 1998,
and 1999) could the consensus (or AP) top five have
remained the same. In four seasons (1997, 2000, 2001,
and 2002) the consensus ranking would have changed
the second spot. Some of these second-spot shifts
would have been minor: in 1997, Michigan (consen-
sus third) would have taken Florida State’s spot at
second place, and Tennessee (consensus third) would
have replaced Florida in second place in 2001. How-
ever, some of the second-place changes would have
been dramatic. The 2000 season would have seen the
greatest move by one team: Nebraska would have
moved six spots from eighth to second, replacing
Miami (FL), which would have dropped to fourth. In
2002, Southern California, the hot team during the
latter part of that season, would have dropped from
consensus second to completely out of the top five
with the minimum-violations restriction. (The impact
on Southern Cal highlights the fact that a minimum-
violations objective weights games early in the year
the same as those later on.) Other significant shifts
in the top five would have included Louisiana State
University’s (LSU’s) move from consensus ninth up
to fifth in 2001, Washington’s move from consensus
sixth to third in 2000, and Texas A&M’s rise from con-
sensus eighth to fifth in 1994.
Impact on the National
Championship Game
For followers of college football in recent years, the
existence of the BCS and its designated national
championship game has been a consistent source of
debate. One of the reasons for the controversy is
the BCS’s partial reliance on mathematical-ranking
systems to determine which two teams should play
in the game and the resulting face-validity problem.
These problems were particularly acute at the end of
the 2000 and 2001 seasons (as discussed earlier) and
also at the end of the 2003 season. In 2003, the BCS
selected Oklahoma and LSU to play in the national
championship game, even though Southern Cal held
the top position in both the major opinion polls going
into the 2003 bowl games.
In an effort to determine whether a minimum-
violations criterion would have changed the partici-
pants in these years or in any of the BCS’s six years
of 1998 through 2003, I solved MinV while examin-
ing only the regular season and conference champi-
onship games in each year (that is, all games prior
to the postseason bowls). These are the games that
the systems used in the BCS ranking formula exam-
ine when determining the two teams to select. Once
I had solved MinV, I followed an iterative process
(Appendix) similar to the one I used to identify the
top five teams to determine whether the BCS could
have selected its top two teams without surpassing
the minimum number of violations. If not, I pro-
ceeded with the process to establish the two highest-
ranked teams in the BCS rankings (BCS Media Guide
2003, BCS Rankings Week 8 2003) that would have
allowed it to meet the the minimum number of vio-
lations (Table 4).
For the most part (in four of the six years), the
BCS could have selected the two teams it had without
surpassing the minimum number of violations. How-
ever, the minimum-violations criterion would have
caused major changes in 2000 and 2001, although
maybe not quite the changes I and likely many oth-
ers would have expected. In 2000, the controversy
swirled around the BCS picking FSU (second) ahead
of Miami (FL) (third) even though Miami had beaten
FSU during the season. However, what did not get
as much attention was the fact that Washington (BCS
fourth) had beaten Miami during the season as well.
Minimum
number of Actual BCS Participants with
Year violations participants MinV adjustments
1998 41 Tennessee, Florida St. Tennessee (1), Florida St. (2)
1999 58 Florida St., Va. Tech. Florida St. (1), Va. Tech. (2)
2000 51 Oklahoma, Florida St. Oklahoma (1), Washington (4)
2001 51 Miami (FL), Nebraska Miami (FL) (1), Oregon (4)
2002 50 Ohio St., Miami (FL) Ohio St. (1), Miami (FL) (2)
2003 59 Oklahoma, LSU Oklahoma (1), LSU (2)
Table 4: The Bowl Championship Series (BCS), begun in 1998, would have
selected different participants in its national championship games in 2000
and 2001 if it had adjusted its final ranking to adhere to the minimum
number of violations (actual BCS rankings are in parentheses).
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As a result, enforcing a minimum number of viola-
tions would have caused Washington to be the pre-
ferred pick to face Oklahoma (BCS number 1). In 2001,
the controversy focused on Nebraska (BCS second)
getting the nod over Colorado (BCS third), which
had beaten Nebraska soundly at the end of the reg-
ular season. However, Colorado had come on strong
at the end of the year after two earlier losses. The
minimum-violations objective would have accounted
for this fact by naming Oregon (BCS fourth) to face
Miami (FL) (BCS number one) in the championship
game. This result is particularly interesting because
Oregon was the second team (behind Miami (FL))
in both the major opinion polls. Thus, the math sys-
tems that caused the BCS to select Nebraska (fourth
in both opinion polls) over Oregon actually forced
a deviation from the minimum-violations ranking.
Finally, a minimum-violations ranking could not have
soothed the turmoil in 2003, as it would have allowed
the BCS’s controversial picks of Oklahoma (number
one) and LSU (second) to play in the 2003 national
championship game, even though many observers felt
Southern Cal (BCS third) should have faced LSU.
The BCS could also have placed LSU and Southern
Cal in the top two without surpassing the minimum
violations.
Retrodictive vs. Predictive Accuracy
A concern regarding any ranking system designed
to optimize retrodictive accuracy is whether retrod-
ictive accuracy actually leads to predictive accuracy.
The optimization of predictive accuracy is a different
problem—and ranking philosophy—from that MinV
addresses. Models developed to address predictive
accuracy often weight recent games more heavily
than early games, use information from prior sea-
sons (that is, start with a preseason ranking), include
adjustments for home-field advantage, and consider
margin of victory in developing the ranking (Wilson
2005b). Indeed, some retrodictive models do some of
these things. However, the overall ranking philoso-
phy, or the definition of what is fair, is the feature that
most distinguishes predictive and retrodictive mod-
els. The general philosophy of predictive models is
to determine which teams are strongest, whereas the
philosophy of a retrodictive model would be to estab-
lish which teams had the most impressive season
(under a minimum-violations philosophy, measured
by actually winning games) and the two are not nec-
essarily the same (Wilson 2005b).
To understand the differences, suppose that in the
opening game of the 2004 season, Virginia Tech (VT),
which was not highly rated going into the season,
had upset Southern Cal (USC), which was the top-
rated team in the preseason polls, and suppose that
the game had been played at USC. A retrodictive
(minimum-violations) model would have ranked VT
ahead of USC after that game, because VT had the
more impressive season up to that point. However,
a predictive model may very well have maintained
USC ahead of VT despite the loss, based on presea-
son information and the expectation that USC would
still end up being a stronger team over the course of
the season. With either model, consternation among
some observers would have been likely. For example,
if USC were still ranked ahead of VT, many (those
that favor a retrodictive (minimum-violations) phi-
losophy) would view that ranking as unfair to VT.
If USC were ranked behind VT, those that believe a
ranking should reflect predictive accuracy might view
that ranking as unfair if they thought that USC was
still the stronger team. (Bihl 2002 discusses the final
regular-season ranking of Florida State and Florida in
1996 in a similar vein.)
A similar issue arises with adjusting for home-field
advantage. Suppose that VT had lost to USC by two
points on the road. Had a ranking model included a
home-field adjustment of three points (as most predic-
tive and many retrodictive systems would), it essen-
tially would have deemed VT the winner of the game
for ranking purposes. Observers who believe actu-
ally winning the game regardless of situational fac-
tors is most important to determining rankings (those
who would espouse a minimum-violations philoso-
phy) would view that as unfair to USC. Those who
believe that a ranking should reflect team strengths
might agree that after accounting for playing on the
road, VT was indeed the better team and that it would
be unfair to rank them otherwise.
Which approach is best is in many ways irrecon-
cilable because it’s largely a matter of which ranking
philosophy one considers fair. Both perspectives have
their proponents. Of the six mathematical systems
included in the BCS ranking in 2004, at least three
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are retrodictive (Wilson 2005a), and one (Colley 2002)
makes no adjustments for margin of victory, home-
field advantage, or date of the game (as does MinV).
The author of one of the BCS’s predictive systems,
Billingsley (2002), considers date of the game and
makes minor adjustments for game site but notes the
importance of fairness in recognizing head-to-head
competition (that is, violations) in the ranking. For
that matter, the BCS ranking itself has been adjusted
in recent years to directly reflect head-to-head com-
petition (Martinich 2002). The interest in retrodictive
performance is further shown by Massey’s inclu-
sion of violation percentage on his compilation page,
Beck’s (2004b) retrodictive accuracy award, Hopkins’
(1997) discussion, and the feedback regarding MinV
I received during the 2004 season. In contrast, many
do not favor a retrodictive or minimum-violations-
ranking approach: for example, Martinich (2002) sup-
ports a predictive approach and the application of
a prediction metric, and Bihl (2001) favors retrodic-
tion but not necessarily a minimum-violations metric.
However, even predictive proponents may be inter-
ested in a minimum-violations ranking for compara-
tive purposes.
Exemplifying the interest in both philosophies and
adjustments to retrodictive systems, Wilson (2005a)
maintains a comprehensive online list of college foot-
ball ranking systems. As of July 21, 2005, Wilson
classified 102 systems as either retrodictive (56) or
predictive (46). I examined the Web sites for the retro-
dictive systems and found that many consider such
factors as margin of victory and home-field advan-
tages, but at least 19 do not consider home-field
advantages, and at least 18 do not consider margin of
victory.
Clearly a range of views exist within and across
the philosophies. The philosophy behind MinV is
that winning the game is the only thing that mat-
ters, regardless of situational factors and regardless
of whether the winning team may not be the one
expected to perform better in later games. Thus, for
example, in MinV, I don’t include an adjustment for
home-field advantage nor do I weight recently played
games more heavily than earlier games. Given the
objective of the model to determine the minimum vio-
lations, and how such a criterion would affect the
two major decisions based on rankings (who’s num-
ber one at the end of the season, and who should
play in the national championship game), I do not
adjust for either factor. However, the model could
easily be modified to do either or both. A single
global home-field advantage variable could be added
(or subtracted) from the left side of each constraint
based on whether the home team won the game.
More recently played games could be weighted more
heavily by simply increasing the weight (the objective
function coefficient) on the violation variables for later
games. This weight could be incrementally increased
for each week (or on each game played by a given
team) over the course of the season. The foundation
provided by MinV will allow for the future evalua-
tion of the predictive (or retrodictive) impact of both
these modifications.
Given the philosophy I employ, the MinV ranking
may not make the best predictions of future games;
as Martinich (2002) demonstrated, retrodictive accu-
racy does not necessarily result in predictive accu-
racy. However, no prior researcher has assessed the
relationship between these two perspectives, because
none have developed systems that optimize the retro-
dictive component (as measured by violation percent-
age) for college football. MinV allows that as a future
research objective.
Experience in 2004
My experience in regularly publishing MinV rankings
online during the 2004 season gave me a partial look
at this relationship and at MinV’s potential predic-
tive accuracy. Early in the 2004 season, I told Kenneth
Massey about the MinV model and asked him to post
weekly rankings from the model during the 2004 sea-
son. Starting on October 16, 2004 (or halfway through
the season) and continuing through January 4, 2005
(the final nine times when rankings were widely pub-
lished for all other systems), Massey (2004d) posted
a weekly ranking from MinV on his ranking com-
pilation page. At his suggestion, I developed a Web
site linked from Massey’s compilation page that pro-
vided the complete MinV ranking for the week and
an overview of the number and percentage of viola-
tions for that week.
To develop the posted ranking for each week,
I used game scores from Wolfe (2004) and solved
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MinV to establish the minimum number of viola-
tions for the games through that weekend. Then,
I solved the model iteratively by adding constraints
to encourage a solution that would match the con-
sensus ranking of those systems that Massey had
compiled at the time I made the MinV runs, or
Massey’s own ranking, which was highly correlated
(99.3 percent) to the consensus ranking and used
twice, on November 13 and 20. (Massey’s final con-
sensus for each week was ultimately affected by rank-
ings posted later in the week and by the MinV
ranking itself.) I tried to encourage a ranking that
matched the secondary target. However, I solved
the model only 15 to 20 times with various sets of
constraints added or deleted at each stage, focusing
only on the top 25 or so teams. My objective was
to obtain a reasonable-looking ranking for Massey
to post to establish a minimum-number-of-violations
benchmark against which to compare the violation
percentage of the other compiled systems.
The MinV ranking was consistently at or near the
bottom (of roughly 100 systems compared each week)
in its correlation to the Massey consensus. For exam-
ple, at the end of the regular season (prior to the
bowl games), the posted MinV ranking’s correlation
to the Massey consensus was 90.4 percent, the lowest
among the 99 systems compiled that week (Massey
2004d). The average was 97.1 percent, with a high of
99.8 percent. Clearly the posted MinV ranking each
week reflected the minimum-violations criterion and
not simply the consensus (or the Massey ranking) that
I used as the secondary objective.
Even so, the MinV rankings would have yielded
intriguing results as prediction tools during 2004.
They would have been mediocre predictors during
the regular season. Beck (2005a, b) computed and
compared the weekly prediction accuracies of up
to 47 ranking systems (not including MinV) each
week of 2004; 42 of these systems made predictions
every week in which I posted a MinV ranking. When
I compared the accuracies of these 42 systems to
MinV’s accuracy for the last half of the regular season
(October 23 through December 4), I found that MinV’s
accuracy would have compared as follows for the
seven weeks (in number of standard deviations from
the average number of correct predictions by Beck’s
42 systems): −323, −117, 0.45, −060, −179, −015,
and −012. In other words, performance was typi-
cally below average but essentially average in four
of the last five weeks. These results are not surpris-
ing, as these regular season games may be influenced
by home-field advantages and recent performances,
which were not built into MinV. The comparatively
poor results for the first week are also not surpris-
ing, as the small sample size at that point (five or
six games for most teams) adversely affects retrod-
ictive systems more than predictive systems, which,
unlike retrodictive systems, incorporate information
from prior years. Without the week of October 23, the
aggregate MinV predictions over the last six weeks
(covering 234 games) were not statistically different
from the average, even using a 10 percent significance
level.
However, the results for bowl game prediction per-
formance were markedly different. The comparison of
bowl prediction performance is one of the best com-
parisons to make regarding predictive accuracies. By
that time, the largest possible sample of games within
the season is available on which to base predictions.
The bowl games are typically more evenly matched
than many of the games played during the sea-
son, making their prediction more difficult. They are
played at largely neutral sites. Their separation by a
few weeks likely reduces any carry-over effect of each
team’s recent performances. The sample of 28 bowl
games also is reasonably sized (in contrast, the predic-
tion accuracy for the week of December 4 was based
on only 10 games). Finally, the two rankings for a
season that most matter are the prebowl ranking and
the postbowl ranking. The BCS (and other bowl offi-
cials) use the prebowl ranking in determining bowl
match-ups, and observers use the postbowl ranking
in determining team positions for the year.
For these rankings, MinV was extremely accu-
rate; its prebowl ranking (through the games of
December 4, 2004), published online in advance of all
bowls, predicted the winners of 19 of the 28 games.
Beck (2005b) and Trono (2005) compared the bowl
prediction accuracy of published ranking systems:
47 by Beck and 99 by Trono. MinV was better than all
47 systems Beck evaluated, each of which successfully
predicted 18 or fewer games. In Trono’s comparison
of 99 systems, including MinV, MinV tied for fourth
in prediction accuracy. The most accurate system
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predicted 22 of the 28 games, and the second- and
third-place systems predicted 20 games. The 98 sys-
tems (other than MinV) averaged 15.76 games correct,
with a standard deviation of 1.65 games, meaning
that MinV’s accuracy was nearly two standard devi-
ations better than the average. (It would have been
nearly 2.5 standard deviations better then the aver-
age of Beck’s systems.) Jeff Sagarin’s system, the lead-
ing predictive system for the season and for the
season’s second half according to Beck’s statistics,
correctly predicted 15 games, the same number that
would have been correctly predicted by picking the
Las Vegas betting favorites (Beck 2005b). By compar-
ison, the Massey consensus ranking used as the sec-
ondary target would have predicted only 14 of the
games correctly (Beck 2005b), meaning that it would
have surpassed only six of the 99 systems Trono com-
pared. Thus, even though the Massey consensus influ-
enced the MinV ranking as the secondary objective,
the minimum-violations objective clearly improved it
considerably. In addition, the MinV bowl predictions
would have gone 17 for 28 against the Las Vegas
point spreads Beck (2004a) reported, which would
have placed MinV fourth against the spread versus
Beck’s 47 other systems. The probability of achieving
this level of success against the spread by chance is
less than 10 percent.
The 2004 MinV prebowl ranking was the best pub-
lished ranking when compared against all 47 systems
Beck evaluated. It had the best predictive accuracy
and the best retrodictive accuracy (an 8.2 percent vio-
lation percentage, whereas the next best system’s vio-
lation percentage was 43 percent higher). No other
system approach this combination, which implies that
the MinV ranking essentially reconciled the retrodic-
tive and predictive ranking philosophies at the final
prediction point in 2004. Of the three systems Trono
evaluated with better bowl-prediction performance,
none approached the retrodictive accuracy of MinV,
as their violation percentages were 59 percent, 96 per-
cent, and 104 percent higher than MinV’s (Massey
2004d). Also, according to Beck, the next best retro-
dictive system (as reported by Massey 2004d) had
a bowl-prediction performance of 16 games correct
(tied for 13th), with an against-the-spread record of 15
for 28 (tied for 18th). Even when accounting for the
point spread, MinV’s performance was well above the
chance level of success and among the top perform-
ers. These results indicate that pursuing a minimum-
violations ranking (or retrodictive accuracy) can also
lead to high predictive accuracy and that further eval-
uation of this relationship merits research.
Additional Interfaces
People have shown interest in the MinV model.
Kenneth Massey asked me to provide weekly MinV
rankings during the 2004–2005 college basketball sea-
son, in addition to those for the football season.
I developed another Web site for this purpose and
posted MinV rankings 12 times during the season,
including a pre-NCAA Tournament ranking covering
all regular-season and conference-tournament games
(the games the NCAA Tournament selection commit-
tee examines when determining its at-large invitees).
Although the size of the basketball-ranking prob-
lem (with 326 teams playing 30+ games instead of
117 teams playing 11–14 games) precluded identifi-
cation of guaranteed optimal solutions in a reason-
able time, the model’s best pretournament ranking
(Massey 2005) produced a violation percentage of 18.3
percent. The next best violation percentage among the
38 other ranking systems compared was 22.8 percent,
or almost 25 percent higher.
Other Web sources also responded favorably to
the introduction of MinV online during 2004. Eugene
Potemkin (2005) included it in his “rank of rating
systems”; his site is linked by Massey. His system
assesses the fairness of ranking systems from multi-
ple points of view and overall. During the last half of
the 2004 season, MinV consistently rated number one
according to Potemkin’s fairness metric when viewed
from the teams’ point of view and occasionally rated
number one overall (out of as many as 105 ranking
systems). Ray Waits and David Wilson, who oper-
ate another Web site devoted to analyzing ranking
systems, included MinV among the nine systems on
their “NCAA Football Superlist,” which include those
developed by BCS participants Kenneth Massey, Jeff
Sagarin, and Peter Wolfe (Waits 2005).
Appendix
Let the variables be defined as:
VIOLATIONi = 1 if loser ranked above winner of
nontied game i, 0 otherwise;
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VIOLATIONAk = 1 if team A ranked ahead of
team B in tied game k, 0 otherwise;
VIOLATIONBk = 1 if team B ranked ahead of
team A in tied game k, 0 otherwise;
TEAMj = value (not the rank) of team j (that is, the
power index for team j);
DIFFAk = difference in values (not the ranks) of the
two teams A and B in tied game k, if A is ranked
ahead of B, over and above the minimum difference
allowed between two teams with different ranks; and
DIFFBk = difference in values (not the ranks) of the
two teams A and B in tied game k, if B is ranked
ahead of A, over and above the minimum difference
allowed between two teams with different ranks.
Let the problem parameters be defined as:
G= total number of nontied games;
i= subscript for a given game in the set of nontied
games;
T = total number of tied games;
k = subscript for a given game in the set of tied
games;
N = total number of teams;
j = subscript for a given team in the set of all teams;
Wi = subscript of winning team in nontied game i;
Li = subscript of losing team in nontied game i;
Ak = subscript of one team in tied game k;
Bk = subscript of the other team in tied game k;
S =minimum difference desired between TEAMWi
and TEAMLi (chosen arbitrarily); and
M = sufficiently large positive number.
The minimum number of violations was deter-
mined using model MinV, as follows:
MinV Min Z =
G∑
i=1
VIOLATIONi
+
T∑
k=1
050VIOLATIONAk
+050VIOLATIONBk (1)
s.t. TEAMWi −TEAMLi +MVIOLATIONi
≥ S i= 1    G (2)
TEAMAk −TEAMBk −DIFFAk
− SVIOLATIONAk
+ SVIOLATIONBk+DIFFBk = 0
k= 1     T  (3)
DIFFAk −MVIOLATIONAk≤ 0
k= 1     T  (4)
DIFFBk −MVIOLATIONBk≤ 0
k= 1     T  (5)
TEAMj ≥ 0 j = 1    N (6)
DIFFAkDIFFBk≥0 k=1T  (7)
VIOLATIONi=01 i=1G (8)
VIOLATIONAkVIOLATIONBk=01
k= 1     T  (9)
Equation (2) forces a violation if a game winner’s
value doesn’t exceed the loser’s. Equations (3), (4),
and (5) force half a violation if teams in a tied
game don’t have identical values. TEAMj , DIFFAk,
and DIFFBk differ depending on the chosen values
of M and S (meaning that TEAMj can’t be interpreted
directly), although the resulting ranking is unaffected.
For each additional win by a team against the same
opponent, one VIOLATIONi and one constraint (2)
can be dropped, if the first win’s VIOLATIONi coeffi-
cient in (1) is incremented by one.
The size of S affected solution efficiency but not
predictably. MinV solved quickly using S = 100 for all
years except 2000, 2002, and 2003, where runs using
S = 100 and S = 010 didn’t solve within 10:00. The
2002 and 2003 models solved with S = 100 within the
pivots and times in Table 1. For 2000, MinV never
solved for any attempted value of S, although it found
a Z within one violation of the lower bound within
5:00. I established this solution’s optimality by adding
constraints to force undefeated Oklahoma’s TEAMj to
exceed each of its four closest competitors’ TEAMj
by S (such constraints for undefeated teams don’t
threaten optimality). MinV then solved within 568,856
pivots and 2:09.
For Table 3, if MinV’s top five didn’t match the con-
sensus, I added constraints to force consensus number
one’s TEAMj to exceed the second’s by S, and simi-
larly to force #2> #3> #4> #5> other highly-ranked
teams. I re-solved MinV and added more constraints
for number five until MinV matched the consensus
top five without increasing Z (implying that mini-
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mizing violations wouldn’t have changed the consen-
sus) or Z increased. If the latter, then I identified the
top five that most closely matched the consensus by
first adding a few constraints to the original MinV to
encourage the consensus first team to have the great-
est TEAMj . I re-solved MinV and added more con-
straints for the consensus first team until it had the
highest TEAMj or Z increased. If the latter, I repeated
the process for the consensus second team (after drop-
ping all constraints added for the first) and then for
the consensus third team, and so forth until the team
that had the best possible consensus rank had the
best TEAMj without increasing Z. Once I identified
the top team, I repeated this iterative process (while
keeping the constraints added in the previous step) to
fill spots 2, 3, 4, and 5, using all remaining teams in
order of their consensus ranking. For example, if the
top spot was assigned to a team other than the con-
sensus number one, then the consensus number one
was the first team considered for the second spot.
In the process I used for Table 4, I focused only
on prebowl games, matching the BCS rankings (not
the consensus ranking) and analyzing just the top two
spots.
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